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I. INTRODUCTION
When Magic Johnson announced to the world that he had the HIV
virus, the world was shocked. Activists heralded it as a breakthrough.
People would finally realize that AIDS can affect everyone. Unfortu-
nately, since this revelation, there has also been fear; fear expressed by
other players in response to the unknown dangers that may be inherent
in playing against someone with the HIV virus.
This comment will analyze the possibility of implementing a
mandatory HIV testing policy in what will be called "professional team
sports"; i.e., the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National
Football League (NFL), and Major League Baseball (MLB). In making
a judgment as to whether to implement such a policy, several areas will
be analyzed, including: (1) the fears of professional athletes relating to
the HIV virus; (2) the risks involved with and the nature of the HIV
virus; (3) the helpful example of league policies and judicial decisions
relating to drug testing; (4) justifications for, and the case law involving
AIDS testing; (5) labor law concerns in implementing testing policies;
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(6) important federal laws which need to be examined before attempting
any such policy; and, (7) some precautionary safety measures that
leagues should be aware of before considering the implementation of
any HIV testing policy. After this analysis a proposal will be made con-
cerning mandatory FIIV testing policies in professional team sports.
II. Ti FEAR OF AIDS IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS
A. Magic Johnson
On November 7, 1991, Magic Johnson stunned the sports world by
announcing that he was retiring from the National Basketball Associa-
tion (NBA).1 Johnson stated that during a routine medical examination
for an insurance policy he had tested positive for HIV - human immu-
nodeficiency virus - the virus which leads to AIDS.2 Fans and players
alike were shocked at this revelation. Magic was a legend - surely he
could not have gotten this dread disease?
As Magic explained, he had probably contracted AIDS while engag-
ing in unprotected heterosexual intercourse.3 To the excitement of
AIDS activists, along with his coming out Magic said that he would lend
his incredible popularity to the fight against AIDS.4
Soon Magic proved restless, and he decided that he wanted to play in
the 1992 NBA All-Star game.5 Though reassured that they had nothing
to fear by playing against Magic, many players stated that they would be
hesitant to guard him.6 And while doctors such as William Reiter, the
Director of Clinical Research at the Center for Special Immunology,
stated that the possibility of "[g]etting AIDS from contact in a basketball
game is negligible," players responded by saying, "doctors say the risk is
very, very low of having the virus transmitted from one person to an-
other in a basketball game, but why take the risk at all?"
7
After the All-Star game and his extraordinarily good health and play,
Magic announced that he would also participate in the Olympics. Imme-
1. Tracey E. George, Secondary Break: Dealing With AIDS in Professional Sports After
the Initial Response to Magic Johnson, 9 U. MIAM ENr. & SPoRTs L. Rsv. 216 (1992); Laker's
Magic Has AIDS Virus, Milwaukee Sentinel, Nov. 8, 1991, at 1A; Gregg Boeck, HIV forces
Magic to Retire; 'This Is Not Like My Life Is Over', USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 1991, at 1A.
2. George, supra note 1, at 216.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Ira Berkow, All-Stars to Give Magic a Nervous Embrace, N. Y. TiMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at
B9.
6. Id.
7. Id. Mark Price of the Cleveland Cavaliers even said that "any risk was too great." Id.
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diately Australian players expressed the possibility that they would not
play against Magic, though they were also resoundingly dismissed as not
understanding the total lack of risk of contamination.8 Later on, another
unnamed American player stated that he could not understand how
players could feel safe if Magic were injured and started bleeding on the
court.9
When Magic decided to rejoin the Lakers for the 1992-1993 season
more players spoke up. Karl Malone, Gerald Wilkins and many other
NBA stars went public with their fears of playing against Magic; fears
that many other players would not publicly express.10 As precautions,
the NBA instituted new rules whereby players who were cut during a
game were to leave immediately. Trainers had to wear gloves at all times
while treating such wounds, and were to handle each player's towels and
other items separately." Along with these precautions, officials were
still adamant in stating that there was no possibility of contracting HIV
by playing basketball. As one doctor stated, "the chance of being in-
fected by playing basketball is roughly the same as being kicked to death
by a duck." 2
Even as doctors and activists dismissed the fears of NBA and other
professional athletes, several commentators admitted that, though it is
easy to criticize players for their ignorant fear, "it is important to re-
8. George, supra note 1, at 218-19.
9. Jack McCallum, Orlando, S4 Barcelona... ?, SPORTS ILLUsmRATED, Jan. 20, 1992, at 56.
Again experts tried to dismiss the possible risks, see Gina Kolata, Experts Try to Dispel Unease
on Johnson, N. Y. Tirws, Feb. 2, 1992, § 8, at 7.
10. Harvey Araton, Johnson's Return to League Isn't Welcomed by Some, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1992, Sec. 8, at 1; See also Tom Friend, No Anger by Johnson On Malone's Remarks, N.
Y. TiMEs, Nov. 4, 1992, at B22. As Mark Price said, "We have people telling us there is a less
than one-per-cent chance of catching it on the basketball court, [b]ut this is not like catching a
cold. We are talking about a deadly disease. If one person catches it, that's one person too
many. If someone doesn't want to play that person should not be criticized. We all have a
right to be concerned." Gerry Dulac, Athletes' AIDS hysteria baffles experts, Tsm GAZEr=,
February 21, 1992, at C5. Moreover, as one writer said, "who can be sure that a bloody cut
can't pass the virus, or mucus or infected sponges or wraps? Evidence is meager, but it does
exist." Robert Lipsyte, Celebrate Magic, but There's More Work to Be Done, N. Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 16, 1992, Sec. 8, at 11. And even Arthur Ashe said, "They say the risk is minimal, but
that's not the same as no risk." 'Not the Same As No Risk', N.Y. TaEs, Nov. 3, 1992, at Bl.
11. Araton, supra note 10, § 8, at 1.
12. George, supra note 1, at 219; As experts point out it is "iron[ic] that professional
athletes who don't practice safe sex run a far greater risk of acquiring H.I.V. than they would
in playing against Magic Johnson." Lawrence K. Altman, Decision Disappoints AIDS Experts,
N. Y. Tims, Nov. 3, 1992, at Bl.
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member that they are the ones who are exposed to the risk, however
slight that risk may be.' 13
Eventually, Magic decided to retire a second time, stating that, "[i]t
has become obvious that the various controversies surrounding my re-
turn are taking away from both basketball as a sport and the larger issue
of living with H.I.V., for me and the many people affected."' 4
B. Reality
Magic Johnson is not the only athletic figure to have contracted the
AIDS virus, although he may be the most famous. Arthur Ashe recently
died of AIDS, most likely contracted during a blood transfusion. 15 Jerry
Smith, a former All-Pro tight end for the Washington Redskins, died of
AIDS in 1986.16 Tom Waddell, a 1968 Olympic decathlete, died in
1987.17 Estaban DeJesus, former World Boxing Council lightweight
champion, died in 1990.18 Chad Kinch, a former NBA player for the
Cleveland Cavaliers and Dallas Mavericks died in 1993.19 Presently, for-
mer Major League Baseball player Glenn Burke is dying of AID. 20
And, former Olympic diver Greg Louganis recently announced that he
had AIDS. This list is merely a representation of the problem. It is im-
portant to note that even with the knowledge of these infected players,
there has only been one alleged report of possible transmission of the
13. George, supra note 1, at 221; see generally, Robert J. Johnson, HIV Infection In Athlet-
ics: What Are The Risks? Who Can Compete?, 92 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 73 (1992) (de-
scribes the risk of HIV transmission in the sports setting); Several doctors were also realizing
that these fears may have some truth, as one Johns Hopkins official stated that the odds of
attaining AIDS "were about the same odds AIDS experts once offered on something as innoc-
uous as a dental visit. They were of little comfort to Kimberly Bergalis, the young Florida
woman who died... after contracting the disease from her dentist." Thom Loverro, It's Show-
time for Magic, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992, at C1.
14. Michael Martinez, Citing 'Controversies,' Johnson Retires Again, N. Y. TIMas, Nov. 3,
1992, at B9.
15. Roger S. Magnusson and Hayden Opie, Infectious Diseases In Sport: Some Legal Is-
sues, in "AMATEUR" SPORT IN A PROFESSIONAL WORLD; NEW HORIZONS FOR LAWYERS AND
SPORTS ADmiISTRATORS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD ANNUAL ANZSLA CONFERENCE, De-
cember 2-4, 1993, at 119.
16. Robert Lipsyte, A Jarring Reveille For Sports, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1991, § 8, at 1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Former NBA Player Dies of AIDS, 8 Tim SPORTS, PARKS & RECREATION L REP. 14
(June 1994).
20. Bill Koenig, Burke, Dying of AIDS, Has 'No Regrets', USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 1994, at
6C.
1995]
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HIV virus at an athletic event. This occurred during a collision in an
Italian soccer game, and this report has been resoundingly criticized.21
Given the knowledge that several players have died due to AIDS, it
must be granted that some players in professional team sports today
probably are infected with AIDS, though they may not know it. Though
the risk of transmission is minimal, the danger is great, because there is
no known cure for AIDS. To understand what can be done to deal with
the problems associated with AIDS in professional team sports, it is nec-
essary to have some understanding of the disease itself and the risks
involved.
III. AN OvERViEw OF THE DISEASE
AIDS is a complex disease which progresses in different stages.
Since this comment does not profess to be medical in nature, it will pro-
ceed with a brief description of the basic problems encountered with
AIDS and the nature of its transmission. There will not be any differen-
tiation noted between different stages and treatments. Any sections of
this comment should be assumed to apply to the problems of athletic
participation by those with any form of AIDS (however defined in the
medical literature). And since players were fearful of playing against
Magic Johnson, who did not even have any symptoms which might be
associated with AIDS, this lack of distinction between stages should not
prove costly to the analysis which will follow. The focus is on the possi-
ble risk of transmission and not the many problems of AIDS itself, which
are beyond the scope and expertise of this paper.
A. HIV
AIDS is a disease caused by the infection of an individual with
HIV.22 HIV is "a retrovirus that penetrates the chromosomes of certain
21. Matthew J. Mitten, Aids & Athletics, 3 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 9 n.26 (1993); Torre
et. al., "Transmission of 1-HV-1 infection via sports injury," LANcEr 335 (1990). The players
involved collided, causing severe cuts above their eyebrows, which resulted in the transfer of
some blood among them. Before the match, one of the players was ILIV positive while the
other was uninfected. wo months after the incident, the IV virus was found in the blood of
the earlier uninfected player. Id. Officials in Italy and around the world have not been able to
rule out nonathletic factors for this contamination. Richard A. Gordon, et al., Infectious Dis-
eases in Competitive Sports, 271 JAMA 862, 865 (1994); See also SHOULD ATHLETES
FEAR HIV CONTRACTION IN THE SPORTS SETTING?, 8 THE SPORTS, PARKS & REC-
REATION L. REP. 6 (June 1994).
22. Penn Lerblance, Legal Redress for Disability Discrimination: Bob, Carol Ted and Al-
ice Encounter AIDS, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 307, 313 (1994). For further broad discus-
sion of the AIDS virus see, eg., NEW DEFINITION INCREASES CASELOAD AND
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human immunity cells that combat infection."23 People with the HIV
infection may remain healthy for a number of years. Eventually, a
number of symptoms occur due to the destruction of the individual's im-
mune system by the virus, "[w]hen the immune system becomes compro-
mised, the infected person becomes susceptible to a variety of so-called
'opportunistic infections,' many of which can prove fatal."'24
AIDS refers to the onset of life-threatening illnesses caused by the
destruction of the immune system and subsequent infection with these
opportunistic diseases."5 Examples of the diseases which may occur are
the following; pneumonias, infections, malignancies, and neurological ill-
nesses.26 In the end, the "AIDS virus infects and brutally kills its vic-
tims, for no known patient diagnosed with AIDS has ever recovered and
the fatality rate stands at 100%."27
B. Transmission
The basic AIDS related fear of professional athletes is the possibility
that the disease could be transmitted to them through their contact with
infected players. However, the HIV virus which causes AIDS is not eas-
ily transmitted.28 The disease can only be transmitted in several distinct
ways; by the direct injection of an infected person's bodily tissue, blood
or blood products into the blood stream, through intimate sexual con-
tact, intravenous drug administration with an infected needle, and from
the breast milk of a contaminated mother to a newborn.2 9 HIV cannot
be transmitted by ordinary casual contact, contact with the saliva or spit
of an infected person, or by ordinary physical contact in the sports set-
PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL, AIDs WKLY., May, 9,1994, at 24; Update: Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 255 JAMA 593 (1986); Karen M. Farizo, et. al., Spec-
trum of Disease in Persons With Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States,
267 JAMA 1797 (1992); Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
256 JAMA 2784 (1986); Treatment of Infections in the Patient With Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, ARcHIVEs INTERNAL MED., May 9, 1994, at 949.
23. Lerblance, supra note 22, at 313.
24. Id.
25. Magnusson & Opie, supra note 15, at 121.
26. Id. at 122.
27. Susan J. Levy, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Im-
munodeficiency Syndrome - AIDS, 37 EMORY L.J. 217 (1988).
28. Wayne R. Cohen, An Economic Analysis of the Issues Surrounding AIDS in the Work-
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ting not involving bloody contact.30 Still, though the risk of transmission
during an athletic event is so low, it is not zero.31
For instance, it is unclear whether a collision between two athletes in
a basketball game, which causes bloody cuts to open up in both players
and some co-mingling of blood, could cause the transmission of the HIV
virus. Or if such a collision between two outfielders could lead to the
same result. Or if the frequent bloody injuries and physical contact in
professional football could cause such transmission. To theoretically
transfer HIV from an infected to an uninfected athlete, the infected ath-
lete would have to be injured and bleed extensively.32 The infected ath-
lete would have to be in the later stages of the disease where the
concentration of the virus would be higher in his blood, and a substantial
amount of this blood would then have to enter the other athlete in an
open wound.3 3 Since the virus cannot survive for more than a few min-
utes in open air, the exposure would have to be for a relatively substan-
tial amount of time.34 Though this seems possible, experts agree that
the possibility is very low.
Obviously, it is this low risk of transmission in professional sports
which has led many commentators to dismiss the fears of professional
athletes as unreasonable. However, one must remember that at present
time, if even one player is infected through physical contact on the play-
ing field, that player will die, because there is no cure. It is understanda-
ble that athletes, who fear that they may be that one player, would fear
the possibility of such contamination.
IV. ANALOGY TO DRUG TESTING
An initial aid in determining what professional team sports leagues
and organizations should do to best serve their players in dealing with
the problem of AIDS is by looking at drug testing in professional sports.
Such testing has been done for several years. It can act as an example of
how any testing policy might be enacted. In addition, the experience and
30. Magnusson & Opie, supra note 15, at 122; see also Randall W. Dick, HIV TRANS-
MISSION UNLIKELY IN PRACTICE OR COMPETITION, NcAA SPORT Sci. EDUC.
NEWSL., Fall 1994, at 3 (discussion of the risks of transmission of the HIV virus in NCAA
competition).
31. As Dr. Reiter said regarding the risk of such transmission, "I didn't say they were nil."
Berkow, supra note 5, at B9.
32. George, supra note 1, at 226.
33. Id. It is speculated that an individual with such a high concentration of the virus
would not be able to participate in professional athletics because they would not have the
requisite stamina to so participate due to the dehabilitating effects of the disease. Id.
34. Id.
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problems the leagues have encountered with drug testing can help to
anticipate problems associated with HIV testing.
A. League Policies
Due to the severe problems that the three major professional leagues
have encountered regarding drug use by players, each league has devel-
oped some sort of drug testing policy.
1. The NBA
Article XXXIII of the NBA's Collective Bargaining Agreement con-
tains the NBA's "Anti-Drug Program."3 The NBA's procedure is based
purely on a reasonable cause method of drug detection. If the NBA or
National Basketball Players Association have any "reasonable cause" to
believe that a player "may have been engaged in the use, possession, or
distribution of a prohibited substance, ' 36 then an Expert appointed
through the collective bargaining agreement to oversee the drug pro-
gram will make a determination as to whether such reasonable cause
does exist.37 If the Expert determines that there is reasonable cause, the
player will be forced to submit to testing. 8 Players are also given the
opportunity to come forward voluntarily, and if they do so they must
undergo a treatment program as proscribed by the agreement. 39 How-
ever, any player who has been convicted of, or has pled guilty to a crime
involving the prohibited substances as described in the agreement, shall
be disqualified from any further association with the NBA.40 All players
agree to follow this provision of the collective bargaining agreement
when they sign their Uniform Player Contract.41
35. NBA-NBPA CoLLacrrvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (1988-1994), Art. XXXIII. It is
acknowledged that as a result of the current labor negotiations this provision may be changed
in the new collective bargaining agreement. But at the present time the courts have allowed
the NBA to use the labor exemption and keep this agreement in place until negotiations have
ended.
36. Id. at § 4(a).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at § 1-2.
40. Id. at § 1; see also PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORrs AND THE LAW:
CASES, MATERiALS AND PROBLEMS 54-55 (1993) (overview of NBA drug policy).
41. NATIONAL BAsKETBrALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACr, Par. 6(d); see
also MARTm J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PAcncnE § 3.09, at 247-253 (1993) (discussion of
the NBA Drug Testing Plan as contained in the Uniform Player Contract).
1995]
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2. The NFL and MLB
Both the NFL and MLB also have plans to combat drug use and
abuse. The NFL has a similar "reasonable cause" type testing proce-
dure, but all athletes are tested for potential health risks and possible
chemical abuse as part of the standard preseason physical.42 After this
process, the NFL resorts to only reasonable cause type testing as de-
scribed in the NBA's anti-drug policy.43
MLB on the other hand does not have a comprehensive substance
abuse policy." While past collective bargaining agreements have con-
tained attempts to deal with the problem with "reasonable cause" types
of testing programs,45 at other times such measures have been left to
management or to declarations by the commissioner.46 At present, base-
ball has no procedure that has been agreed to by management and the
players, and incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement.47
B. Attacks on Drug Testing
Drug testing policies are often attacked on the grounds that the indi-
vidual's constitutional rights have been infringed upon. Such claims
cover a wide range of rights, including; the right of privacy,48 the right
against self-incrimination, 49 the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures,5 0 and equal protection rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment.5 1 While all of these attacks may be valid in the con-
text of state imposed drug testing policies, "[d]rug testing in the NFL,
NBA, and MLB... is generally a regulatory procedure conducted by pri-
42. Laurence M. Rose and Timothy H. Girard, Drug Testing in Professional and College
Sports, 36 KAN. L. REv. 787, 792-793 (1988); 1990 & 1991 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY.
43. NFL SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICIES, supra note 42, at Par. 5; see also WEILER and ROB-
EiRTs, supra note 40, at 47-54 & 57-61 (discussion of NFL Substance Abuse Policies).
44. Again, due to the present climate in MLB this may change if the sides ever reach a
new collective bargaining agreement; See also Glenn M. Wong and Richard J. Ensor, Major
League Baseball and Drugs: Fight the Problem or the Player?, 11 NovA L. REv. 779 (1987)
(for a general discussion of the MLB policies regarding drug use).
45. See, e.g., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL DRUG TEnNG POLICY AND PROCEDURES,
April 1990.
46. As when Commissioner Fay Vincent imposed a lifetime ban on Steve Howe. Edward
Rippey, Contractual Freedom Over Substance-Related Issues in Major League Baseball, 1
SporTs LAW. J. 143 (1994).
47. Id. at 149.
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. U.S. CONT. amend. V.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. U.S. CONT. amend. XIV.
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vate employers, and therefore, the professional athlete's constitutional
fights are not infringed upon by requiring drug tests in those leagues.""2
These areas must still be surveyed as they may prove to be problematic if
leagues attempt to impose industry wide testing procedures (for drugs or
IV infection) as state actors. Professional team sports leagues might
be found to be state actors if a sufficient nexus could be established be-
tween such leagues and the state or a state agency. 3
1. Privacy
The right of privacy prohibits intrusion into a person's intimate rela-
tionships or activities and allows the individual the freedom to make fun-
damental choices involving his relationships and conduct.5 4 Any conduct
or statute that interferes with this right must meet the requirements of
strict judicial scrutiny in order to be upheld.55 Such conduct will only
withstand this scrutiny if it is the "least restrictive means tailored to com-
pelling state interests." 56
The closest case to deal with this right as it relates to drug testing in
the professional sports context was Shoemaker v. HandeL57 In Shoe-
maker, the plaintiff sued the New York State Racing Commission chal-
lenging regulations that imposed mandatory drug and alcohol testing
requirements on all jockeys. The court stated that "[t]he right to privacy
is not absolute. '58 The court recognized that the state has the power to
compel the disclosure of private information (i.e. the use of drugs) when
the state's interest in the disclosure outweighs the individual's interest in
non-disclosure; and in this case the state's interest was found to be
compelling. 9
Though this case dealt with a state actor imposing drug testing re-
quirements, it does show that professional leagues, if found to be state
52. Rose & Girard, supra note 42, at 807.
53. Danil R. Gregus, The NFL's Drug-Testing Policies: Are They Constitutional?, 10
WHi-rrrMR Err. & SPoRTs LAw. 1, 2 (1993).
54. J. Otis Cochran, Drug Testing of Athletes and the United States Constitution: Crisis and
Conflict, 92 DicK. L. REv. 571, 585 (1988).
55. Id. at 586.
56. Id.; see also Harold Edgar and Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of
AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J. L. AD MED. 155 (1990) (for an overview of privacy
issues involved with HIV); GARY I. WADLER & BRIAN HAuIuE, DRUGS AND TiE ATHLETE
195, 235-238 (1989).
57. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C.N.J. 1985); aff'd 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479
U.S. 986 (1987).
58. Id. at 1106.
59. Id.
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actors in any way, would also be subject to the same scrutiny. And while
it seems apparent that drug testing would be upheld as a valid public
interest, it is not clear whether HIV testing would be upheld under the
same reasoning.
2. Search and Seizure
Interrelated with privacy claims are claims relying on the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures. Under
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n ° and National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab,6 drug testing by urine collection has been
held to be a search and therefore subject to constitutional analysis under
the Fourth Amendment. A similar Fourth Amendment claim was also
brought in Shoemaker, but again the court weighed the interests in-
volved and found that the drug testing program did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 62 The court found a strong state interest in con-
ducting such searches and a reduced interest in protection from such a
search because the industry was historically intensely regulated.63
Again, if professional team sports leagues were ever attacked as state
actors they would also have to show that the state's interest in discover-
ing an individual's HIV status (which also would be found to be a search
as blood would be extracted from an individual for testing) or in drug
testing outweighed the individual player's interest in being free from
such searches.
3. Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination in-
volves three basic factors. These factors include: compulsion, in that in-
dividuals should not be forced to incriminate themselves against their
will; communication, the protection normally only extends to verbal
communication; and criminality, the evidence must relate to some con-
duct that is criminally punishablef a6 Mandatory drug testing would
clearly violate the compulsion requirement because the athlete would
basically be forced to admit his guilt or use of drugs.65 The communica-
tive aspect of the protection only applies to word of mouth communica-
tion, therefore, this protection would not extend to drug testing as it is
60. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
61. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
62. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
63. Id. at 1142-1143.
64. Cochran, supra note 54, at 583-85.
65. Id.
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not verbally communicative in and of itself.66 The final element relates
to criminality in that the information relates to some conduct that is
criminally punishable.67 While the use of drugs may be criminally pun-
ishable in some jurisdictions, the leagues do not profess policies of turn-
ing in players for criminal sanctions after they test positive. Therefore,
this protection would also be of little value.
As to HIV testing, the compulsion and communicative elements
would undergo the same analysis and conclusions as already made with
drug testing. In addition, HIV testing would not directly relate to any
criminal conduct in having the disease in itself. Therefore, this aspect of
Fifth Amendment protection would not be violated.
4. Equal Protection
A final possible constitutional claim to testing would be an equal pro-
tection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Players may chal-
lenge testing by claiming that though they are being tested, other
individuals (officials, managers, etc.) are not. Therefore, the players are
not receiving the same protection under the laws. A similar claim was
presented in Shoemaker.6 9 However, the court rejected this claim, find-
ing that the state's interest was paramount and so the equal protection
claim was invalid.70
It is hard to imagine what type of claim a professional athlete could
make to assert that the leagues testing policies come under constitutional
scrutiny because the leagues are state actors, and the policies also violate
the player's equal protection rights. If the policy was uniform it would
seem to avoid such problems.7' Leagues would merely have to test all
individuals under their employment to avoid these problems. This
would not seem prohibitive, and even seems plausible if the leagues are
intent on fighting drug abuse, and discovering those who have AIDS.
In sum, the constitutional provisions which have been discussed will
only prove problematic for the major sports leagues if the leagues are
66. Id. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (finding that a police of-
ficer's conduct in ordering that a doctor extract blood from hospitalized person after accident
to detect intoxication was not violative of this communicative aspect of fifth amendment
protection).
67. Cochran, supra note 54, at 585.
68. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
69. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1105.
70. Id.
71. Moreover, MLB has even had testing policies which required that its employees, and
other officials be tested, not merely the players. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBAL. DRUG TESrn G
PoLIcY AND PROuREs, April 1990.
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found to be state actors. This is an implausible result, especially if test-
ing policies were instituted at the team level. Still, this analysis of drug
testing shows that the leagues have had at least some past exposure to
the testing of their athletes, and so they would not be unfamiliar with the
ways in which they should develop a new type of testing policy.
V. MANDATORY ADS TESTING
Professional team sports leagues might adopt some sort of testing
policies to protect their players and to provide early detection to those
infected with the HIV virus. However, since Magic Johnson announced
his retirement, none of the three major leagues have instituted compre-
hensive policies to test their players.
For example, the NFL will only allow for testing on a voluntary basis,
though it has also distributed informational material to its teams to let
them know of the risks involved.72 The NBA and NBPA hired an AIDS
specialist from Johns Hopkins University to act as their consultant, pro-
viding educational training for all NBA members, and the NBA enacted
safety guidelines (i.e. the NBA requires bleeding players to leave the
game until the bleeding stops and the wound is bandaged) based on the
World Health Organization Consensus Statement on AIDS in Sports.
73
MLB officials have not undertaken any particular precautions because of
their perception that the risk of HIV transmission in baseball is even
lower than that in the other major sports.74
All of these leagues seem to have taken heart in the position of so
many experts that the risk of HIV transmission in the sports setting is
very low, if not zero. Maybe this "viewpoint might change if definite
proof of HIV transmission on the athletic field.. .becomes available,"'
and the leagues will be unprepared.
A. Example
Unlike the three major team sports leagues, professional boxers
often must submit to mandatory HIV testing. Both Nevada and Oregon
72. Thom Loverro, Pro Leagues Encourage Discussions on AIDS, Thm WASH. TIMFS,
Feb. 9, 1992, at C4; Giants Given H.LV. Tests, N. Y. Trans, May 21, 1992, at B21; Commis-
sioner Tagliabue even stated that he had not been presented with a persuasive case for league-
wide testing for the HIV virus. Timothy W. Smith, N.FL.'s AIDS Policy? There Isn't One,
Yet, N. Y. TiKvrs, Nov. 10, 1991, § 8, at 2.
73. Marsha F. Goldsmith, When Sports and HIV Share the Bil4 Smart Money Goes On
Common Sense, 267 JAMA 1311 (1992); Loverro, supra note 72, at C4.
74. Goldsmith, supra note 73, at 1312.
75. Johnson, supra note 13, at 88.
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require such testing of athletes who box within their jurisdictions. 76 Fur-
thermore, Top Rank, Inc., requires all fighters on its card to be tested for
HIV,7 7 and the World Boxing Council has voted to require that all box-
ers in major bouts undergo testing for mIV.78
Another employer which does require such mandatory testing is the
military.79 Although no recruits are required to undergo such testing,
the alternative is that they not enter the military.80 Furthermore, any
individual within the military who is found to be infected will be immedi-
ately discharged.8 '
B. Questionable Goals
Since the methods of transmission of the HIV virus are so restricted,
sports leagues would need to come up with substantial justifications for
creating HIV testing policies. It must be noted at this point that leagues
that implement voluntary testing procedures would not need similar jus-
tifications because testing would be a matter of personal choice. How-
ever, even voluntary testing policies would have to avoid problems with
confidentiality and privacy concerns involved with these test results.
Though sports leagues may state that any sort of testing is merely a
measure to protect uninfected players from possible danger, given the
low risk of transmission of HIV, this infringement on a player's right by
mandatory testing may seem unfounded. In an attempt to support a pos-
sible decision to impose mandatory HIV testing requirements within a
professional sports league this comment will try to provide some justifi-
cations for such a measure.
1. Reduction of HIV Transmission
One goal that may be envisioned through testing is the actual reduc-
tion of the spread of HIV infection. One rationale for why this would
occur is because individuals who test positive will change their life styles
and take precautions to avoid possible transmission to others.' Such
76. Mitten, supra note 21, at 11.
77. Id.
78. W.B.C. Sets H.V. Tests For Fights, N. Y. Tmirs, Nov. 14, 1992, § 1, at 31.
79. Emily Campbell, Mandatory AIDS Testing and Privacy: A Psycholegal Perspective, 66
N. D. L. REv. 449, 463 (1990).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See generally Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for
the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interests With the Individual's
Privacy Interest, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 327, 341 (1991).
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testing may succeed in identifying those individuals infected. However,
since they probably were not infected on the playing field or court, any
cessation of athletic competition will not prove to be a benefit to them or
an actual reduction of risk to non-infected individuals. The risk is almost
zero even before an individual is detected as HLV infected. What really
needs to change is the behavior of professional athletes off the court or
field because that is where the real risk of HIV infection is apparent.'m
Testing in professional sports will not of itself reduce the possibility of
HIV transmission as long as the risk of transmission in professional
sports is so low.
2. Accuracy of Results
Another problem will be the accuracy of such tests. It has been esti-
mated that in high-risk groups, such as intravenous drug users, HIV tests
will prove 99% accurate, however, in low-risk groups (of which profes-
sional athletes will only be included regarding their risk during athletic
competition) such accuracy may be one to two thirds lower.84 Therefore,
even though many athletes may be included in such high-risk groups due
to their lifestyles of unprotected sex outside of athletics, they will not be
a high-risk group during competition. Positive testing then, may not re-
late to the risks within athletics, but instead to the risks of such a lifes-
tyle. This would point to the necessity for better education for athletes
as to their risky off court lifestyles, and not necessitate testing within
athletics.
3. Protection
A final justification may be that testing will insure that competitors
do not have to worry about the danger of possible transmission of -IV
from other competitors. This goal clearly is illusory. As already de-
scribed, the possibility of transmission during athletics is very low. Ath-
letes who fear such transmission need to be educated about this low risk.
Testing will do nothing to protect uninfected players. Precautionary
measures, such as removing bleeding players immediately, should be un-
83. As Mervyn Silverman of the American Foundation for AIDS Research stated, "It's
what athletes are doing off the court that is the real issue." Loverro, supra note 13, at C1.
84. Eisenstat, supra note 82, at 350. The explanation for these statistics is that positive
results are more likely to be accurate in high risk groups than in low risk groups because of the
actual increased probability of actual infection in these high risk groups. Therefore, tests are
more often accurate in these high risk groups because the probability of infection is so much
higher. Positive results in low risk groups are often incorrect because the probability of infec-
tion is lower. Id.
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dertaken as the primary means of protection. Athletes then must pro-
tect themselves outside of the playing field where the risks are probably
greater.
C. Advantages
Even given the questionable goals of mandatory testing, there are
some advantages. Initially, it must be recognized that mandatory testing
will at least provide early detection to those who are infected.8 5 Though
there is no cure for the HIV virus, if a player knows that he is infected he
can seek earlier treatment to mitigate the onset of complications result-
ing from HIV infection, warn those that he is in sexual relations with of
possible infection, and avoid possible instances where transmission to
other individuals could occur. There are many new treatments which
can at least slow the onset of the disease. 6 This will at least (possibly)
allow the player to live a somewhat longer life and to assess their lives so
they can make a fully informed decision as to how to proceed.
If a uniform, mandatory, league-wide policy were implemented, no
individuals would go undetected and lose valuable treatment time be-
cause they did not voluntarily seek to be tested to discover their HIV
status. Individuals could not avoid testing due to fear that their test re-
sults might be positive.
Mandatory testing may also make uninfected individuals change
risky behavior. It seems likely that many athletes have not listened to
the repeated call to take precautions due to the AIDS epidemic. As
evidenced by Wilt Chamberlain and Magic Johnson, athletes still "sleep
around" and often engage in unprotected sex.' Mandatory testing may
provide a wake up call to these athletes who just will not listen to the
warnings that health officials have been providing since the early 1980s.
D. Disadvantages
Regardless of these possible advantages or benefits of mandatory
HIV testing, there are disadvantages and problems that such a policy
would create. As already noted, the problems with accuracy of testing
85. A. Alyce Werdel, Student Article: Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Lega4 Ethical and
Practical Issues, 5 No=ma DAME J. L. E'rIcs & PUB POL'Y 155, 186 (1990).
86. Id. at 186-93. Such new treatments are beyond the coverage and expertise of this
essay. For discussion of such treatments see for example, AIDS Page: Progress Reports in the
Battle Against Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome; New Treatment Approved, 28 FDA
CONSUMER 7 (1994), also see, BIOCONTROL SEES RESULTS IN STUDY OF NEW
TREATMENT FOR AIDS, PR NEwswiRB, March 1, 1994.
87. George, supra note 1, at 228.
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will be a definite disadvantage of any mandatory HIV testing policy, and
such a policy may focus the question of risk on the playing field and not
on the athletes' personal lives where it should probably be.
An individual who is forced to undergo AIDS testing and is found to
have the HIV virus may suffer a "severely damaging psychological reac-
tion."'  There is no cure, and individuals will realize that this disease,
however contracted, will most likely cause their death. 9 This realization
is emotionally and mentally devastating.
The public often treats professional athletes as untouchable heros.
Athletes cannot be blamed for feeling that they are special with the
amount of money and admiration they receive. Yet, when a player
learns that he has AIDS, the public opinion of him will fall, however
warrantless and unfair this may be. Beyond the realization that he will
die due to this disease, he must also learn how to fit into a society that
still treats those with AIDS with fear and avoidance. This social stigma
is severe. Persons with AIDS are often unfairly discriminated against,
and, as evidenced in the Magic Johnson situation, many people think
they should be excluded from their prior activities.90 They are also often
falsely labeled as homosexual or of some other high risk group that
many people perceive as deviant.91
It must be recognized that the social stigma and psychological
problems associated with AIDS are not really a direct result of the test-
ing. If an individual were not tested and was HIV positive he risks trans-
mitting the disease to others and possibly avoiding treatment which
might appreciably mitigate the advance of the disease.92 Though the so-
cial stigma is unfair and unjustified, only those who pervade such stigma
are degraded. They are ignorant or uncaring and only education can
help change them. Avoiding positive test results merely by avoiding test-
ing will have no affect on the disease. If someone is infected, they are
infected no matter whether they know it or not. There is no justification
for avoiding test results merely to avoid the truth. The infection will not
change with such avoidance.
88. Mitten, supra note 21, at 16.
89. As one court stated, such a positive test result "has been compared to receiving a
death sentence." Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (1988).
90. Mitten, supra note 21, at 23-24.
91. Id. at 16-17.
92. Werdel, supra note 85, at 186.
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E. Case Law
While recognizing these negative effects of an HV testing policy, this
analysis will now move to an examination of the relevant case law which
has dealt with similar policies outside of the sports world.
1. Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation93
In Glover, a mental health facility required that its employees submit
to HIV testing or face disciplinary action. The justification for this re-
quirement was the risk of exposure to residents due to the resident's own
assaultive behavior (i.e. biting and scratching) toward the employees. In
sum, the court found that this justification was insufficient since the risk
of HIV transmission in this way was "minuscule, trivial, extremely low
and approaching zero." 94 Therefore, this justification did not outweigh
the intrusion on the employee's rights and the testing was an unreasona-
ble search under the Fourth Amendment.95
2. Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 196
One year later in Leckelt, the court was faced with a similar consider-
ation. In Leckelt, the hospital learned that a nurse's roommate had been
hospitalized with AIDS. The hospital feared that the nurse (whom they
believed to be homosexual) could have also been infected and would be
a risk to the hospital's patients. Therefore, the hospital demanded that
the nurse undergo HIV testing. When he told the hospital that he had
been tested, the hospital demanded that he provide the results of his
tests, which he refused to provide. The nurse was subsequently fired.
The court again balanced the interests of those involved. The court
found that the nurse's privacy interest, though important, had been di-
minished by his knowledge of the hospital's policies regarding infection
control which he was well aware of (having worked there for eight
years). In addition, in a hospital setting the risk of transmission of HIV
was higher than that in Glover.97 Therefore, there was a valid govern-
mental interest which overrode the nurse's right to be free from such a
search.98
93. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
94. Id. at 464.
95. Id. at 465; see also Terry Summers, Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of
Retardation: Federal Court Invalidates AIDS Policy, 57 U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 369.
96. Leckelt v. Bd of Comm's of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, et al., 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La.
1989).
97. Id. at 1391-1392.
98. Id.
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3. Plowman v. United States Department of the Army99
In Plowman, the court was faced with a review of the army's non-
consensual HIV testing of a civilian employee. In apparent violation of
army policy, which required the consent of its civilian employees prior to
conducting HIV testing, an admitting physician ordered that the plaintiff
be tested for HIV as part of diagnostic blood tests performed upon hos-
pital admittance. Upon finding that the plaintiff was infected, the army
doctor informed four army officers before informing the plaintiff. The
plaintiff sued claiming a violation of substantive due process and her
right to privacy. The court dismissed these claims finding that the army
doctor's interest in knowing the HIV status of the prospective surgical
patient and the fact that the blood had already been drawn as part of
hospital admittance, outweighed the plaintiff's fourth amendment
rights.10
0
4. Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States Department of State, et al.'101
In Local 1812, the court reviewed a policy of the State Department
which required mandatory IIV testing of employees seeking foreign as-
signment. The court upheld the reasonableness of this policy because (as
in Plowman) the blood had already been drawn for other testing, and the
government's interest in sending individuals who were fit for duty was
related to the HIV testing, outweighing the minimal intrusions on the
plaintiffs. 10 2
5. Johnetta v. Municipal Court°3
In Johnetta, the California court reviewed a lower court's decision
ordering the testing of an individual who bit a police officer. The order
was based on a statute which called for the testing of any individual who
interfered with the duties of a police officer in a manner capable of
transmitting HIV.1°4 The court attempted to balance the interests of the
plaintiff against those of the government in this instance. The court
found that the taking of a blood sample (as drug testing in Skinner) was
99. Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988).
100. Id. at 636-637.
101. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, et al., 662
F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
102. Id. at 53.
103. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
104. Id. at 669.
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a minimal intrusion.105 Furthermore, since the testing was done as part
of her being charged with a crime, again her privacy interest was dimin-
ished.1 6 The court distinguished this case from Glover by relying on the
fact that she was being tested under the statute due to her assault on the
officer, even though the risk of HIV from biting was very low.10 7
6. Summary
These cases leave the impression that courts will often seek a way to
allow for such HIV testing as long as there is a strong governmental
interest in such testing. If defendants can show a real risk (Plowman), or
a definite history of such precautionary measures (Leckelt), or that a
blood sample has already been taken for a valid governmental purpose
(Local 1812), or a statutory provision calling for such testing (Johnetta),
such testing will be upheld. However, Glover showed that the courts
may not always allow testing especially where the risk of infection is
very low (among other deciding factors.)
In applying these cases to the professional team sports context, ini-
tially federal constitutional claims would not be applicable to such pri-
vate actors. Also, until it is shown that there is more than a minimal risk
of infection to other players, there may be no overriding justification for
mandatory testing.
VI. LABOR LAW CONCERNS
Every professional team sport league operates within the parameters
of an agreed upon collective bargaining agreement as negotiated be-
tween player unions and management.108 Such agreements and negotia-
tions are governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).10 9
Therefore, the focus must now shift to the implications of a mandatory
HIV testing policy under prevailing labor law.
105. Id. at 680-681.
106. Id. at 684-685.
107. Id. at 682.
108. 1993 Settlement of All Litigation Between the NFL and the NFLPA & NFL Players
(now part of the new Collective Bargaining Agreement); BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
AMERICAN AND NATIONAL LEAGUES OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND THE MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (1990-1993); NBA-NBPA CoLLECrlvE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENT (1988-1994). These agreements will most likely change in the near future.
109. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1948).
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A. The NLRA
Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA protect employees who engage
in concerted activity for their mutual benefit, from employer discipline
or discharge. 110 Section 8(d) of the NLRA makes the duty to bargain
with the union mandatory in certain circumstances.1 ' These circum-
stances include bargaining over such items as "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment . . 112 These are known as
"mandatory subjects of bargaining" and employers are required to bar-
gain in good faith until impasse over these subjects.- 3 This means that
an employer cannot merely unilaterally impose mandatory terms before
impasse, without risking the violation of the NLRA."14 In relation to a
mandatory HIV testing policy, the question will be whether such a policy
is then a mandatory subject of bargaining.
B. Testing as Mandatory Subject
In two 1989 decisions, Johnson-Bateman15 and Minneapolis Star
Tribune 16 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that em-
ployers are required to bargain fully over drug testing policies.1 17 There-
fore, such testing policies are mandatory subjects of bargaining and an
employer must bargain over them with the union until impasse. Impasse
can be understood as the point where negotiations have ended and
either side will not change their proposals any further to reach an agree-
ment. The NLRB also ruled that a union does not waive its right to
bargain over such policies just because a particular collective bargaining
agreement is silent over drug testing or aspects of a testing policy.",,
Such rights are waived only if the union specifically relinquishes them.
This analysis would seem easily transferable to professional team
sports league HIV testing policies. Mandatory HIV testing is a way to
110. Id. §§ 7, 8(a)(1).
111. Id. § 8(d).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. David J. Sisson & Brian D. Texell, The National Football League's Substance Abuse
Policy: Is Further Conflict Between Players and Management Inevitable, 2 MARQ. SPoRTs L. J.
1, 21 (1991).
115. 295 N.L.RB. 26 (1989).
116. 295 N.L.R.B. 63 (1989).
117. Sisson & Trexell, supra note 114, at 21. See also Ethan Lock, The Legality Under the
National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by National Football League Owners to Unilaterally
Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FiA. L. REv. 1 (1987) (for further analysis of the
rationale behind the mandatory nature of testing in collective bargaining).
118. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. at 25.
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test a player to find out a certain status of that player, as is drug testing.
Drug testing is done to find out whether the player is a drug user, while
HIV testing would be done to find out whether the player is H[V posi-
tive. The NLRB would have to rule that it also would be a mandatory
subject of bargaining. In fact, HIV testing, due to the seriousness of the
possible results, the necessary confidentiality of these results, and other
problems associated with such testing, would seem to be a more impor-
tant subject of bargaining than drug testing. Though drug use could af-
fect working conditions significantly, HIV infection may create the
necessity for thorough precautions, education, and other changes within
a professional league above the individual problems associated with drug
use.
As a mandatory subject of bargaining, mandatory IV testing would
have to be collectively bargained over. As one commentator remarked,
The process of collective bargaining affords both sides the best
opportunity to articulate and weigh their respective interests, de-
cide when and for what to compromise, and when to remain
steadfast. It presents the best opportunity to reach a quid pro
quo which, taking into account the unique interest of each side, is
both definitive and satisfactory to both sides... the process of
collective bargaining allows the parties mutually to draft a con-
tract which spells out precisely which types of testing are permis-
sible and which are not.119
Before it could be implemented, a mandatory HIV testing policy in pro-
fessional team sports would have to be negotiated over within the con-
text of collective bargaining. Though it is uncertain what type of policy
would be agreed upon, collective bargaining is the best approach.
VII. FEDERAL LAW
Before any suggestion as to whether to implement a mandatory HIV
testing policy in professional team sports, it is important to look at the
federal laws which would be implicated by any such policy. These laws
will be important in deciding both how to implement such testing and
what measures to take with regards to those individuals who are found
to be HV positive.
119. Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M. McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DicK. L. RPv.
505, 569 (1988). Furthermore, if unions and management collectively bargain over any drug
testing scheme, "a strong presumption supports the legality of the scheme." RAY YAssER,
JAMES R. McCtmDy AND C. PmnR GOPLERTJD, SPORTS LAw: CASES AND MA EmA.Ls 463,
491 (1990).
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A. Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973120 was passed to prevent discrimina-
tion against the handicapped. Section 504 of the Act prohibits discrimi-
nation against handicapped people by all organizations that receive
federal financial assistance.'21 To recover under this Act an individual
athlete with HIV must show that they are: (1) an individual with a handi-
cap; (2) excluded solely because of their handicap; (3) otherwise quali-
fied to participate; and (4) excluded from participation in, denied the
benefits of or subjected to discrimination under a program receivingfed-
eral financial assistance."2
Several cases have dealt with the question of whether HIV infection
is covered as a disability under this Act. Initially in School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline,23 the Supreme Court dealt with a case involv-
ing the dismissal of an elementary school teacher after a third relapse of
tuberculosis. Shortly after this case was granted certiorari, the Justice
Department issued its opinion that discrimination by an employer
against persons infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS would not be
unlawful if prompted by fears of contagion, even if such fears were
found to be unreasonable. 24 The Court refused to follow this opinion as
it might relate to tuberculosis, another infectious disease. The Court
found that "[a]llowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of
a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of
section 504. 1125 In other words, individuals with contagious diseases
such as tuberculosis (and AIDS) were meant to be covered under sec-
tion 504 and can be classified as handicapped individuals under the Act.
The possible risk of contagion would then be a factor in determining
whether such individual was otherwise qualified as also required under
Section 504.126
120. Pub. L. No. 93-112,87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982)).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794. See also Michael L. Closen, Susan Marie Connor, Howard L. Kauf-
man and Mark E. Wojcik, AIDs in America: Death, Privacy and the Law, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 26,
26-30 (Summer 1987); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Aids Discrimination Under Federal State and
Local Law After Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221 (1987).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
123. 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987).
124. Memo from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Section 504 of Rehabilitation
Act to Persons with AIDS, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 195, at D-11 (October 7, 1988).
125. School Bd. of Nassau County, 107 S.Ct. at 1129.
126. Id. at 1129-1130; see also M.E. Lally-Green, Is AIDs a Handicap Under the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 After School Board v. Arline and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987?,
19 U. TOL. L. REv. 603 (1988).
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Two further cases also bear noting. First, in Chalk v. United States
District Court,127 the Ninth Circuit held that absolute certainty of HlV
transmission from schoolroom or workplace contact is not a prerequisite
to protection under Section 504.1' And second, in Cain v. Hyatt, 2 9 a
district court held that Section 504 protected an employee who was dis-
charged after testing positive for HIV.130
Taken together these cases suggest that if a professional athlete could
meet each part of the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, he could be protected from any discrimination that might occur due
to his HIV positive status. Clearly after Arline, HIV infection or AIDS
would count as disabilities under the Act. Moreover, following Cain, a
player could not be fired for testing positive for 1IIV infection regardless
of how the player became infected. The prohibitive factor would most
likely be the showing that the employer received federal funds. How-
ever, since many teams acquire public funding to stay in an area, to build
a stadium or arena, or are literally co-owned by state agencies, this bur-
den may not be impossible to overcome.
B. Civil Rights Restoration Act
Section 9 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198711 amended the
Rehabilitation Act in two significant ways (for the purposes of this anal-
ysis.) First, the Rehabilitation Act was amended so that it now prohibits
discrimination against handicapped individuals in all operations of a fed-
eral institution or an institution receiving federal funds. 32 Second, the
Act amended the Rehabilitation Act to provide that protection does not
extend to an individual who has "a currently contagious disease or infec-
tion and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by rea-
son of the currently contagious disease or infection is unable to perform
the duties of the job."'1 33
It is possible that due to the expanded definition of covered entities,
professional sports leagues might again come under the Rehabilitation
Act as previously discussed. And it seems that a mandatory HIV testing
127. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
128. Id. at 709.
129. 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
130. Id. at 686-687.
131. Pub. Law 100-259, 102 Stat. 28.
132. 102 Stat. at 29-30.
133. Id. See generally Leigh Ann Tschim, Comment, AIDS as a Protected Handicap
Under the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 35 Loy. L. Rlv. 243 (1989).
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policy could be made which would allow for the dismissal of certain indi-
viduals if it were ever shown that HIV infection does cause significant
risk of transmission to other players in these sports (though this determi-
nation has not been even remotely hinted at yet), or if the particular
infected athletes are not able to perform their jobs due to their HIV
infection (this also seems irrelevant because an individual at such a
dehabilitating stage of HIV infection would not have the stamina to par-
ticipate anyway, so it seems implausible that such an individual would
even attempt to play).
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The federal statute that will have the most impact on any proposed
mandatory HIV policy is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).134
The ADA was the first federal law enacted to protect persons with AIDS
from discrimination by private employers. 35 In essence, the ADA re-
quires that employers provide reasonable accomodations to otherwise
qualified individuals with disabilities, provided that such accomodations
do not force the employer to suffer an undue burden.
136
1. Employers Covered
There are three sections of the ADA which are particularly impor-
tant to the sports field.' 37 First, the ADA applies to public entities and
to employers with fifteen or more employees, with jobs in industries that
affect interstate commerce. 38 Second, anyone who owns, leases, or op-
erates a place of public accommodation is also covered by the ADA. 39
And third, such places of accommodation include; gymnasiums, golf
courses, or any other place of exercise or recreation. 40 Therefore, given
these requirements any "professional teams, and operators of sporting
134. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12114.
135. Laura Pincus, The Americans With Disabilities Acg" Employer's New Responsibilities
to HIV-Positive Employees, 21 HoEsrRA L. REv. 561, 566 (1993).
136. Id.; For a good overview of the ADA see Gerald L. Mantman, Jr., An Overview of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 38 No. 7 PRAc. LAW. 21 (1992) and WALTER T. CHAMPION,
JR., SPoRTs LAW 232-234 (1993); See also G. William Davenport, The Americans With Disa-
bilities Act: An Appraisal of the Major Employment-Related Compliance and Litigation Issues,
43 ALA. L. REv. 307 (1992).
137. Mitten, supra note 21, at 35.
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-32, 12111(5)(A).
139. Id. at § 12182(a).
140. Id. at § 12181(7)(L).
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events held in facilities open to the public are subject to the ADA.""14
This definition would also include professional sports leagues.
2. Prohibition against Discrimination
The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating against a
covered employee. A covered employee will include any "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability" who is discriminated against "because of the
disability of such individual."'142 Furthermore, such a qualified individ-
ual must also be a disabled person who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, could perform the essential functions of the employment
position that they hold.143 Discrimination by an employer, such as a pro-
fessional sports league, will encompass the following; (1) "excluding a
professional athlete from a sport because of a known disability,'"144 (2)
not reasonably accommodating for a known disability of an otherwise
qualified athlete, when such accommodation would not impose undue
hardship on the league,'145 and (3) using standards that are not job-re-
lated for the position and consistent with business necessity, to screen
out athletes with disabilities from such positions. 146 A mandatory HV
testing policy might be enacted so as to discover infected players and
find some way to keep them from playing or to force them to follow
special requirements for playing. Such goals would be discriminatory
under the ADA as long as HIV infection or AIDS is found to be a cov-
ered disability under the ADA.
3. Who Is Disabled?
For an employee, such as a professional athlete, to show that they are
protected by the ADA, they must meet three requirements. The ADA
defines a person with a disability as an individual who: (1) has a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; 47 (2) has a record of such an impairment; 48
or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 49 The ADA regula-
tions promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
141. Mitten, supra note 21, at 35.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
143. Lerblance, supra note 22, at 332.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
145. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
146. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
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(EEOC) specify that a person with HIV infection is disabled within the
meaning just described.1 5 0 The EEOC also states that I{[V is an impair-
ment which is substantially limiting as the term is used under the ADA
definition. 5 ' Therefore, any covered employer (such as a professional
sports league) would violate the ADA by discriminating against any indi-
vidual (or player) who has HIV or AIDS, because of this disability.
4. What Employers Can Do
The only way in which an employer will be allowed to treat a dis-
abled individual differently than one who is not disabled, is if that indi-
vidual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the
workplace.152 The EEOC Guidelines further provide that such a risk
"can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high
probability of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insuffi-
cient."' 5 3 Discrimination against such disabled employees will only be
justified if there is objective medical evidence that the individual poses a
high probability of substantial harm to others.'5 4 In the case of someone
in Magic Johnson's condition, where he posed such a low risk to anyone
else, it would be discriminatory to disallow individuals such as him, with
IV infection but no real symptoms or health problems, to participate in
professional athletics. If the disease had progressed further a team
might not want to risk any danger to the infected player due to the physi-
cal nature of competition, or the possibility that the higher concentration
of HIV in the infected player's blood might increase the risk of transmis-
sion to other players. But it is still hard to imagine how such an individ-
ual would be able to play in the first place. They would not be otherwise
qualified and would not fall under the protection of the ADA.
Though the ADA does not prohibit medical testing of employees,
leagues would have to show that such testing was related to some job-
related concern and that the testing was carried out in a non-discrimina-
tory manner. 55 And even if a collective bargaining agreement could be
reached regarding such testing on a league-wide level, there would still
150. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,548 (1991); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1992); The ADA's legislative history
also specifically listed HIV infection as a covered physical impairment so it is clear that Con-
gress intended it to be so covered by the Act. See S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1989); H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 & pt. 3, at 28 (1990).
151. 56 Fed. Reg. 35734 (1991); Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(g) (1992).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
153. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 414.
154. Id.
155. George, supra note 1, at 233.
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be problems of privacy and confidentiality. The actions of the leagues
might be found to be discriminatory depending on what they do to play-
ers who test positive.
Once it is determined that an individual is actually disabled (possibly
through positive HIV testing) and still qualified for the particular job,
the ADA requires that the employer make reasonable accomodations to
the known disabilities of the employee. 56 Reasonable accommodation
as explained by the EEOC includes any modification or adjustment that
enables a qualified individual with a disability to (1) be considered for
the position that individual desires, (2) perform the essential functions of
that position, or (3) enjoy the same benefits and privileges of similarly
situated employees without disabilities. 57 These accomodations must
only be undertaken by employers if they do not impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the employer's business. The ADA lists ex-
amples of such reasonable accomodations which may include:
[m]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities.. .and job restructur-
ing, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a va-
cant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations,
training materials and policies... and other similar accomoda-
tions for individuals with disabilities. 59
It is possible that if a player were found to be HIV infected, a team
would have to change practice or training requirements for that player,
change the amount or duration of road trips, and even modify what
games he would be able to play in, assuming that the player wanted to
continue playing, and assuming that the player was in worse physical
shape than someone like Magic Johnson, due to the progression of the
disease. Furthermore, employers may have to initiate some stringent
confidentiality policies as to the identity of HIV positive players, 6 '
though it is unclear how this would be done in such a public arena as
professional sports.
Clearly, an employer would not have to come up with measures that
would allow infected players to continue playing, if they were not
healthy enough to even participate on a regular basis, and if such accom-
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); SEE FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION Patricia K. Loop, Ac-
commodating HIV-Positive Employees, 38 No. 3 PRAc. LAW. 27 (1992).
157. 29 U.S.C. pt. 1630.2(o).
158. Id.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
160. Pincus, supra note 135, at 580.
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modation of this player would cause further extensive difficulties on the
part of the employer. These measures could be seen as unreasonable.
These types of situations would most likely fall in the realm of undue
hardship as defined in the Act.'61
VIII. NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS
Before a professional team sports league would even consider adopt-
ing a mandatory HIV testing policy they should consider taking several
precautionary or safety measures.
A. World Health Organization Consensus Statement
In 1989 the World Health Organization (WHO) developed its Con-
sensus Statement on "AIDS and Sports."' 62 This statement was in-
161. "Undue hardship" is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
162. The full text of the consensus statement is as follows:
World Health Organization Consensus Statement - Consultation on AIDS and Sports
1. No evidence exists for a risk of transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) when infected persons engaging in sports have no bleeding wounds or other skin le-
sions. There is no documented instance of HIV infection acquired through participation in
sports. However, there is a possible very low risk of HIV transmission when one athlete who
is infected has a bleeding wound or a skin lesion with exudate and another athlete has a skin
lesion or exposed mucous membrane that could possibly serve as a portal of entry for the
virus.
2. The possible very low risk of HIV transmission through sports participation would prin-
cipally involve the combative sports with direct body contact and other sports where bleeding
may be expected to occur. In such sports, the following procedures should be considered:
a. If a skin lesion is observed, it should be immediately cleansed with a suitable anti-
septic and securely covered.
b. If a bleeding wound occurs, the individual's participation should be interrupted until
the bleeding has been stopped and the wound is both cleansed with antiseptic and
securely covered or occluded.
3. As in other health care settings, for the safety of personnel drawing blood samples from
athletes, protective gloves should be worn.
4. Sports organizations, sports clubs and sports groups have special opportunities for addi-
tional meaningful AIDS education of athletes, sports officials and ancillary personnel.
The following should constitute the core of information provided:
a. HIV can be transmitted through sexual intercourse, blood, and from infected
mother to child. Sexual transmission can be either man to woman, woman to man or
man to man, and transmission by blood can include any injection practice in which
nonsterile needles and/or syringes are used.
b. For transmission of HIV through blood to occur during sport, the blood of an in-
fected person must contaminate a lesion/wound or mucous membrane of another per-
son. It should be the responsibility of any athlete participating in a combative sport
with direct body contact who has a wound or other skin lesion to report it immediately
to a responsible official, and to report for medical attention.
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tended to serve as guidance for sports organizations and health
professionals as to the dangers and realities of AIDS in sports. The Con-
sensus Statement makes it clear that there is a very low possibility of
HIV transmission in sport, although that possibility may be higher in
contact sports (such as football and possibly basketball).163
The statement also provides many suggestions that professional team
sports organizations should consider in making any policy decisions to-
ward treating or dealing with players with AIDS. In fact, these precau-
tions should be taken with respect to all players to avoid any possible
problems with transmission of AIDS, even though the chances are very
remote. These precautions include: immediately cleaning and securely
covering all skin lesions,16 removing any bleeding players until the
bleeding has stopped and the wound is covered,' 6 5 and the wearing of
protective gloves whenever drawing blood samples from athletes. 66
The Consensus Statement also suggests that athletes should be in-
formed about the ways HIV can be transmitted, and that these athletes
should be responsible for reporting cuts or other wounds immediately to
be safely treated. 67 The Statement says that there is no "medical or
public health justification for testing or screening for HIV infection prior
to participation in sports activities."' 63 Overall, education is needed to
show athletes that the risk is minimal though precautions should still be
taken.
c. HIV is not transmitted through saliva, sweat, tears, urine, respiratory droplets, hand-
shaking, swimming, pool water, communal bath water, toilets, food or drinking water.
5. There is no medical or public health justification for testing or screening for HIV infec-
tion prior to participation in sports activities.
6. Persons who know they are HIV infected should seek medical counseling about further
participation in sports in order to assess risks to their own health as well as the theoretically
possible risk of transmission of HIV to others.
7. Sports organizations, sports clubs and sports groups should be aware of the above rec-
ommendations and ensure that all participants, sports officials and ancillary personnel are
aware of them. In addition, this may provide the opportunity for reviewing general hygienic
practices relating to sports.
8. National level sports organizations are urged to contact national acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome committees or programmes for further information regarding IV in-
fection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). World Health Organization
Consensus Statement - Consultation on AIDS and Sports, 267 JAMA 1312 (1992).
163. Id. para. 1-2.
164. Id. para. 2(a).
165. Id. para. 2(b).
166. Id. para. 3.
167. Id. para. 4(a & b).
168. Id. para. 5.
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B. OSHA Regulations
Another statement of precautions is contained in the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) 1991 final regulations re-
garding occupational exposure to HIV and other bloodborne patho-
gens.169 These regulations extend to employers "who reasonably
anticipate the skin, eyes, or mucous membranes of their employees will
come into contact with blood or other potentially infectious material
during job performance. '' 17 Therefore, these regulations may not apply
to professional team sport employers. Still they present recommenda-
tions similar to the WHO statement and they should be looked at for
further safety measures that can only help a professional team sport
employer.
C. Education
Probably the most important aspect of any program instituted in pro-
fessional team sports is education. Many athletes still fear possible infec-
tion with HIV due to contact with other players during athletic
competition, despite all of the assurances that such a risk is remote, if
not zero.171 Athletes must be educated about the remote danger of IIV
infection from athletic participation, and also of the necessary safety pre-
cautions they should undertake on the playing field and in their personal
lives. As already mentioned some leagues have instituted these types of
educational endeavors. Education about HIV will not only help players
understand the low risk if they take precautions, it may also prevent
uninfected players from creating the social stigma against those that are
infected. As one AIDS expert stated regarding playing with Magic John-
son, "[t]hose NBA players who have been given decent information
about the disease are perfectly comfortable.. .but [t]hose that know less
about it are concerned and worried."'172
169. 56 Fed. Reg. 64004; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910.1030 (1991); The Wisconsin Intercollegiate
Athletic Association (WIAA) has promulgated similar precautions which are also helpful. See
Clean Up Procedures For Blood Or Bodily Fluid Spills, 71 WIAA Buu..anN 18 (November
18, 1994).
170. Loop, supra note 156, at 29.
171. Mitten, supra note 21, at 9.
172. Larry lye, Experts Say Fears Unfounded. Johnson Poses Virtually No Threat to
Spread AIDS on Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1992, at 52 (quoting Dr. Rogers, NBA AIDS
consultant.)
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D. Coordination
The only way that these measures can be successful is if there is some
form of coordination among the leagues and among all levels of athletic
participation; amateur and professional. 173 Players will always begin at
the lower levels of athletic competition. Even at these initial levels, they
should be given the same information regarding the risks and necessary
precautions that must be taken to avoid possible infection with the HIV
virus. 1 7 4 Such coordination is another form of education. And if learned
at these early stages of development the risks at higher levels of play can
only be lowered because players have become more thoroughly
informed.
IX. A TESTING POLICY
While it is true that the best solution to the problem of HIV and
AIDS may be through more education for players about the risks in-
volved, this does not mean that a mandatory 11IV testing policy would
have no merit. All of the problems with testing that have been men-
tioned seem to focus on the reason for such testing. And, admittedly, if
leagues were to institute a testing policy only to find out who was HIV
positive and to terminate them, they would be found to have acted dis-
criminatorily, under the ADA. Moreover, if such a policy was unilater-
ally implemented, it would come under the scrutiny of the NLRA and
the NLRB.
The problem with any rationale in treating a mandatory HIV testing
policy in the same way as a drug testing policy is that drug testing is
usually done more for the image of a league than for the protection of
the players. Even if the aim is protection it is protection of the player
using drugs and not the other players. HIV testing would not be for the
protection of any players involved, as long as the probability of transmis-
sion through competition is so low. The league would not be protecting
any uninfected players by finding out which players were infected unless
the league undertook some other safety and educational measures in ad-
dition to such testing. Testing would not protect those found to be HIV
positive because they would only be learning their status. Without other
measures this would do nothing to fight the disease.
As repeatedly mentioned, though the risk is close to zero, it is not
zero. At present time, there is no cure for AIDS. A player who is in-
173. George, supra note 1, at 239.
174. Id.
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fected within this window between no and minimal probability will still
most likely die of AIDS.
Given this knowledge, the only rationale players could put forth to
avoid such testing is that they will face psychological problems or social
stigma as already discussed. The answer to the problem of social stigma
is education of those involved. If this does not work, then those who still
treat HIV positive players in a different way are merely uneducated.
The stigma may still hurt, but it cannot compare to the fact that one is
infected with HIV. Furthermore, the stigma is society wide. Leagues
cannot be held responsible for something they have no control over.
As to the psychological trauma a player will encounter when he finds
out that he is HIV positive, that will come regardless. It is not only un-
reasonable, but also ill-advised for a player to avoid testing for this rea-
son. The player may lose valuable time in treatment that could prolong
his life and help him avoid transmitting the disease to others. No one
wants to get AIDS but any reasonable person should want to know
whether they have it to assess their future and see what can be done to
prolong their life.
If the leagues were able to collectively bargain on an AIDS testing
policy, they should push for a mandatory policy. To protect against dis-
criminatory problems under the ADA (or even the Rehabilitation Act)
the leagues should make clear that individuals will not be terminated for
testing HIV positive. Testing will be done to provide players and league
officials with information to properly act in problematic situations where
possible transmission may occur, and to provide early detection and sup-
port to those who test positive. The leagues should make it clear that the
policy is only there to properly assess the problem within each particular
sport, to better approach accommodating these individuals and dealing
with the problem of AIDS.
Of course there are personal privacy and confidentiality considera-
tions which must be recognized. Players may state that their HIV status
is a personal matter. Therefore, they would feel that involuntary testing
violates their right to keep the knowledge of their status to themselves.
These privacy concerns are important, but such information can be
protected even in an involuntary testing system. The system could be set
up carefully with cooperation between management and the players to
best keep such information from going public. Often these privacy con-
cerns are offered when a particular player wants to avoid the reality that
he might be infected, and not because the athlete is concerned about his
privacy interest.
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There is fear involved in this knowledge of course, but that should
not be a reason to avoid reality. This fear is the real fear that underlies
all of the cries by players to not have to play against Magic Johnson or
anyone with HIV. Though the players may have feared contraction of
the virus, with the risk so low this fear is clearly unreasonable when well-
informed.175 The only fear left is a player's fear that he is actually iHV
positive; a fear which leads him to avoid testing, to stigmatize those who
are HIV positive, and to avoid precautions in personal life where the
dangers may be higher. This fear is also unreasonable due to the obvious
benefits to a player in knowing that he is HIV positive.
Confidentiality concerns are also misleading. Even if players found
out that they were HIV positive on a voluntary basis from a personal
physician, the public nature of their job would make it almost impossible
for this fact to be kept confidential. 176 This may not be fair, but this is
reality. The leagues with their vast resources should serve to help HIV
positive athletes deal with this fact and could better help keep this infor-
mation confidential. Leagues could also present this information to the
public, with the approval, consent and cooperation of the player, in a
more positive way. Positive in that the league can support the player in
their coming out with the fact that they are BIV positive to dissuade
public perception that may assume that the player is homosexual or an
intravenous drug user, or of some other group that the public may unjus-
tifiably characterize as deviant.
Leagues should not go public with such results just because they have
such information. But if a player wants to continue playing, as they
should be allowed to do in following the ADA and reasonable ac-
comodations, this information will come out at some time. Therefore,
unions and management can develop methods to protect this informa-
tion and only let it out in a way which has the least negative effects on
the player.
175. This fear is unreasonable in the same way that it could be said that smokers are
unreasonable in not recognizing the risks of cancer that may be inherent in smoking. After all
of the testing and documented affects how could anyone who continues to smoke be thought
of as reasonable in an objective sense. This is similar to a players being unreasonable in
refusing to play with someone who has the AIDS virus. Once informed about the negligible
risk involved, an objectively reasonable judgement would lead one to believe that taking pre-
cautions could reduce the risk even to zero. Admittedly, such judgements are always clouded
with emotion and this use of reason may not be possible in such a situation. However, it is just
this emotional fear which takes away from a player's reasoned judgement and adds to the
further stigmatization of those with AIDS.
176. Even if a player was a "role player" or "bench warmer" in some small town, this
would be just the type of information reporters would look for to make a big story.
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A mandatory HIV testing policy will not actually reduce the trans-
mission of the virus, be positively accurate, or protect other players in
and of itself. However, as tests become more accurate, and those in-
fected and uninfected become better informed about the risks of trans-
mission, this testing will result in fewer possibilities of transmission. All
those concerned will know the dangers and the risks and presumably
take adequate precautions. There may be no medical justification or ne-
cessity for such testing, but, because it primarily benefits those found
positive it is something leagues and unions should consider as their duty
to provide.
Many commentators, activists and experts seem to think that it is no
one else's right to know whether another player has AIDS or to force
someone to undergo testing to see if they are so infected. Though it may
be true that there is no right to such information, the possible harm with-
out it is tremendous. Even with precautions, if one highly improbable
accident takes place and an uninfected player becomes infected, that
player will most likely die of AIDS. That player should have the right to
protect himself from such a possibility (however remote). The leagues
should take the responsibility to develop a policy whereby such risk is
not merely "negligible" but actually zero.
More importantly, although players may not want their HIV status to
become known within the league, this information will help the early
detection and treatment for those found positive. And with education
others can learn that they have nothing to be afraid of. The fear associ-
ated with AIDS is real fear, even if unreasonable. The only way to fight
it is through education and awareness.
X. CONCLUSION
Professional sports leagues should take the lead in the fight against
AIDS by developing comprehensive HIV educational, precautionary,
and testing procedures. Though most past commentators have con-
demned mandatory testing, if it is done with the aim of better assessing
the problem within a sport, as a part of comprehensive program of
awareness and education, in conjunction with reasonable accommoda-
tion of those found HIV positive, and within the context of collective
bargaining, it should be undertaken. A policy could be developed with a
goal of providing early detection to those who are infected, helping them
seek treatment, accommodating them in the playing arena, and keeping
this information as confidential as possible.
Sports are highly public and powerful mediums to inform many peo-
ple throughout the United States. If sports leagues would take the lead
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in the fight against AIDS they could hopefully help alleviate some of the
stereotypes and discrimination caused towards those with HIV or AIDS.
This may seem like an unreasonable assessment. Yet, how many people
watch Monday Night Football? Or the Super Bowl? Or the World Se-
ries? Or the NBA Finals? Professional team sports as an industry has
access to millions, if not billions, of people. This industry also employs
stars who are known worldwide. If this industry were to develop a plan
as envisioned in this comment, many more people would at least be
aware of the dangers of HIV contagion within risky lifestyles.
Beyond this goal, the individuals who have HIV will know that they
are infected earlier, and may even be able to prolong their lives. What
greater benefit could such a policy look for? They may face scorn from
other players or other people, but this is nothing compared to the harm
the disease will cause them.
In the end, an integrated safety-minded and educational mandatory
HIV testing policy aimed at informing those infected of their status and
the treatment available, and informing those uninfected of the actual
dangers involved and safety precautions they should take, is something
that leagues should try to develop. Hopefully some leagues will have the
courage to make such proposals in future collective bargaining negotia-
tions. Then players will realize that they need not fear the spread of
AIDS through competition, and that some of their friends and team-
mates infected with HV need their help to travel the hard road ahead of
them.
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